Mike Bloomberg Returns

Mike Bloomberg did no favors for his friend Mr. Doctoroff who left  his role as CEO rather than succumb to political pressure from insiders imbued with power from Bloomberg. This pressure was apparently enough to thwart any changes that Doctoroff attempted. Trends like this follow most founder returns.  And this one hits pretty close to home.

Cook at Apple is much better off (and performance shows).  No one around to second guess him. No wonder he is smiling.

Family Business

Over the past few decades, I've had several experiences with family businesses.  None were my family (which probably is the reason I've had to work so hard in my career).  But they are a special breed of entrepreneurial endeavor.  Recently, I was interviewed for an article in the Harvard Business Review about a fictional (at least the names were changed to protect the guilty) family business.  Attached is a link to that article.  The Ex-CEO Contemplates a Coup.

Back to School

Last Thursday I made what has become an annual pilgrimage to Cambridge, Massachusetts for a set of MBA classes at Harvard Business School and MIT's Sloan School.  In the classes, a combination of professors lead by Noam Wasserman present the Les is More X 4 case that was created several years ago.  Each year is both humbling and invigorating.  Humbling in hearing these smart students pick apart my actions at the various CEO engagements that I've had. (I sure wish I had carried around a pocket sized HBS class with me before I did some of the things I did.)  Invigorating, in that I get energized by the exuberance of the students and their intellectual prowess and innovative thinking.

This year however was a bit different than the four years prior.  First of all I was set up to do five classes in one day at the two Universities -three at Harvard and then two at MIT.  Even just physically, it is difficult to get "up" for each of five classes in about 8 hours of duration, as well as navigating through Cambridge across the river (Charles) and between these two schools.  But perhaps more interesting is how the day started and ended.

Typically I arrive on the Harvard campus about an hour before the first class.  This was no exception.  I was greeted by Matthew O'Connell, Professor Noam Wasserman's assistant.  He ushered me into Noam's office where we touched base about the logistics for the upcoming day.  This year, Magnus Thor Torfason, Assistant Professor of Business Administration, was joining in the fun and has been teaching a 3rd section of Founders' Dilemmas at HBS.  Our cordial conversation started off as usual with Noam mentioning innocently along the way that a partner from Northbridge Venture Partners would be attending the class as a guest.  Apparently Noam had not put together the name, Michael Skok with the case itself and was unaware that Michael was actually the Board member at Active Endpoints that had at the end of the case been the lead board member who fired me.  Awkward was an understatement.  Noam asked whether we should make different plans.  We both agreed that we would proceed as usual with Noam making me promise not to change anything about the way we had gone about presenting the case in the past.  For the uninitiated, the case ends with me playing the role of Michael as the student plays me, negotiating his role as CEO.

In any event, the class went on as planned.  I was quite aware of trying not to hold anything back and when it got to the time where I played my board in a mock phone call with the student, I gave as real a rendition of what actually happened as I could.

So how did Michael react?  He paid what perhaps could have been the ultimate compliment to me and to Noam the author of the case.  He said that he emphatically believed that what we had portrayed was completely authentic!  In the event that I have not, over the past 7 years, been able to vent my emotion over what happened that infamous spring,  I now am over it!

And so you ask, how did the ending top that?

In the last class which took place at MIT, I was finally and comfortably situated in the classroom in advance of the class.  Professor Matt Marx and I had decided that I would not be introduced to the class until about half way through when the students had (incorrectly as always) voted on what they expected the outcome of the Active Endpoints case would be.  Shortly after the class started, while interrogating my actions at Metaserver, my first venture as CEO, one of the students who was exasperated by the stupidity of one of my actions blurted out: "Les needs to put on his big boy pants" in order to become more mature in my approach.

When it came time for the vote and the class all voted as usual that I would save the day, Matt innocently points to me in the back of the room and asked whether or not the class was correct.  When I answered, I suggested that I would have to pause for a moment in advance and "put on my big boy pants" first.  The class erupted in laughter.  And the student who had made this statement was embarrassed.  But it was all in good fun and education as I took the floor and answered the eager questions from the students.

Afterward, by the way, I told the student to make sure he never backs down when he has thoughts like he did.  Because, although it might have been awkward to hear, he no doubt was correct!

Founder Rebounds

It seems to happen often. Expensive, heavily recruited, extremely qualified (on paper), high profile "professional" CEO brought in to take a founder-led company to the next level. Usually these situations start off with great expectation. Sometimes even a quick jolt of good performance. And then .... much more quietly, the Board reinstalls the founder to take over for a now floundering organization.

What does this mean? A bad hire. An organization that can't exist without the founder's magic. Just another phase of a company's growth.

Many companies have experienced it recently - Nike, Dell, Yahoo, and hoards of others whose names do not register as quickly.

Here are my thoughts on what might actually be happening behind the scenes:

1) It is hard to replace an icon, no matter who you are. Being the second act behind a nationally recognized figure is an awesome task. The expectations may be more than most can live into.

2) It's hard to be your own person with an icon looking over your shoulder. With the specter of the person who performed the magic that got the company to where it is hanging out in the wings, its hard to enact change. No matter what words are used, or how much support the newly hired CEO gets from the founder or the board, its a false belief that real change can occur with your predecessor standing nearby.

3) Some hires are just the wrong choices. Hiring is an art, not a science. Sometimes well intentioned boards and founders hire a person who is not capable of doing what is necessary. If it looks like a duck, smells like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, sometimes it really is a duck!

4) Circumstances change. Sometimes the replacement hire is the right person and can adequately handle the job at the time they are hired. But subsequently the company grows, changes and the new challenges require different leadership. Leaders don't always grow at the same pace as their organization.

No matter what the reasons for the ultimate mismatch, is bringing back the founder the right answer? It's a question that remains unanswered. But perhaps its the best answer the Board can come up with at the moment.

Time to Replace Yourself

Fortune Small Business recently posted an article with this title. While I believe the article is a pretty good rendition of what founders go through when they determine they need some help, the issues touched upon are just the tip of the iceberg and are probably only appropriate from a founder’s point of view. But having been the replacement CEO for four different founders, as a successor to a founder you are often fighting an uphill battle trying to do things differently than the founder - especially when the founder is still peering over your shoulder. Often the founder/CEO may decide they need help, but not know how to accept it. In one of these companies, I used to joke that the founder encouraged me to initiate any changes that I thought were necessary as long as he agreed. This was a difficult charge, since doing only those things that the founder agreed with potentially doomed us to relive the past and not improve the business.

It is a unique founder indeed who is willing to leave a successor alone and let them make what the founder may feel are mistakes in order to take the business to the next level. In my experience, the founders who figured out how to get out of the way and give the new CEO the same full reign they maintained when they were running the show, are the ones who ultimately were able to reap the rewards of a successful liquidity event. The others were drastically different outcomes.

Of course you’ve got to have the courage and the foresight to hire the right successor. I am an advocate of “try before you buy” - hiring a successor CEO as a consultant or in a less invasive role before making a final succession decision. But continuing to hold tight on the reins after making that decision can compound the issues rather than solve them.

I’ve often considered that the best prescription for a founder who has determined that they need to hire a new CEO, is to get completely out of the way - which may require leaving the company - in order to empower the new CEO to make the necessary changes.

Large companies tend to understand this when replacing a CEO. Take the example of GE. Welch engaged in an extensive process to identify the appropriate successor. But when Welch stepped down from the role, he quickly extricated himself from the business altogether to enable Immelt to lead the company in an entirely new direction.

Make Yourself Dispensible

Where would your company be without you? Better off?

Most Founders don't even consider where their companies would be without them. In fact, founder organizations often require intimate and frequent communications with the founder. This is the natural result of a driven founder with intimate knowledge of the marketplace and the solution being produced . Founders tend to take few vacations that allow them to become untethered from the organizations they created. Founders make many (most) of the critical decisions for their companies. Founders hire people who execute on the founder's decisions - usually not decision makers themselves.

But have you ever thought about whether this is bad or good for your company? While it may feel good to the founder - no decision gets made by some bumble head who doesn't know as much as the founder - and it may make the early stages of a company function efficiently - no bureaucracy, in the long run this poses an undue constraint on the organization as it grows beyond double digits of employees.

Founder decision making is just like the days of time sharing computers. For those of you who are not old enough to remember, time sharing computers gave multiple people access to a single computing resource (usually connected via a slow dial up line and acoustic coupled modem) by slicing the time the processor was dedicated to each individual task. Usually this was done fast enough to make the user believe she had unfettered access to the computing resource. However, when enough people tried to access the computer all at the same time, the response times suffered. (We actually are spoiled now - we accepted these delays as normal - such lack of responsiveness even under the best of conditions would not be acceptable today.)

Similarly, as the load increases on the founder with more and more employees clamouring for access to the founder, decisions get slower and slower - sooner or later bringing the organization to its knees.

It is the unique founder who "gets this" (before her board steps in) and begins to decentralize decision making. Often founders feel uncomfortable taking this step - allowing the bumble heads to make the decisions. They are too used to being the "go to" person for all major issues that anything short of that leaves them numb. But as soon as a founder realizes that she can hire smart people and permit them to make some of their own decisions, the organization gains a whole other level of potential and cycle times can begin to reduce.

So next time you revel in the idea of your indispensability - think again! Maybe you need a vacation?

Sticking around too long?

I recently was referred to a blog post on Fred Wilson's Musings of a VC in NYC. Fred suggests that keeping a founder around post his replacement - moving "up" as he calls it - is an important positive development. I think Fred may not realize that while it may have positive implications for the right personality founder, it may pose some significant issues for the hired gun CEO who steps into a position which perhaps may have been previously filled by a "legend." Forcing a newly hired gun CEO to operate in the shadow of a large personality who has accomplished the impossible of starting and building a substantial company from scratch, while someone remains to look over his shoulder, can be an undue burden that hinders rather than helps the company. The fact that many founders return to their old jobs years later may not be as good a prescription as Fred leaves us to believe.

Good CEO's are not puppets. Moving the founder "up" to become the puppeteer to manipulate his strings (unfortunately what it appears happens with some founders who stick around), is likely not what you hired his successor for. When change is required (which often is the reason for replacing the founder to begin with) keeping the old guard around and still "in charge" as Chairman, can be a sea anchor on the successor's ability to implement change. It is a unique founder for sure who does not try to perpetuate their own ideas even when moved out of the CEO role.

Witness what may go down in history as one of the best performed transitions (albeit not of a founder, but the analogy certainly still holds) with Jack Welch giving way to Jeff Immelt. Jack carefully picked his successor after years of scrutiny (may be a big lesson there too on the care taken to select the successor - See my posting on Try Before you Buy) and then left the company entirely, in order to enable Immelt to do the right thing and not be encumbered by Jack's legacy. Jack clearly was quite a successful CEO. By all rights he could have stuck around and "helped" Jeff transition the company into its next stage. Instead, Jack felt it necessary to get out of the way. In fact, Immelt undid many of the well worn strategies that made GE successful during the Jack Welch era. But Jack was smart enough to realize that change was necessary and chose a capable successor, gave him the keys and waved him goodbye.

Is Jack available if Jeff needs him? Sure! But he is careful not to have his shadow restrict the vision that Immelt requires to take the company to the next level.

A very bad Transition

A good friend of mine in Austin, TX, Hank Jones (Henry W. Jones, III Esq.) who is an industry pundit and expert on Open Source issues, sent me information on a founder transition that really went awry. According to allegations filed by the company in the Superior Court in Orange County, California, Medsphere apparently twice tried to find a CEO to take over from two founder brothers ( Why CEOs Fail?). The first ended abruptly less than a year into the new CEO's tenure when the brothers forced the Board's hand. A second CEO was recruited with even more egregious consequences. According to the company's amended complaint, the two founder brothers got so angry at the direction the new second CEO put in place (only three short months after he took over), they clandestinely published the source code for the company's proprietary software as open source. That certainly put a crimp in the new CEO's plans (see his letter regarding the company's open source stance). Wow! Talk about a bad transition! Boards everywhere should be paying close attention to how dire the consequences of a bad transition can be and what an awkward position they can be put in when founders join together to counter a new CEO.

2-Feb-07 --> The story continues to develop.

Try before you Buy?

Most of us who have been through or witnessed a founder transition would agree that this is no doubt a tricky process fraught with potential disaster at nearly every turn. Yet the process most companies and boards engage in with the potential CEO replacement is one that is set up for failure. And failure is what too often results.

Several interviews with various members of the management team and board, some surface level background and reference checks, discussions with some "insiders" who know what this candidate has done in the past, can never be sufficient to really know whether the most important criterion for successful founder transition will be met. That criterion is the chemistry and relationship that is required between the founder and the newly hired CEO.

While most of the "hard" criteria for founder/CEO transition can be learned using a time tested recruiting and interview process, the "soft" skill compatibility can probably never be really understood without trying it out. In-the-trenches interaction between the potential candidate and the founder and team might actually be the only way to really know if this transition will work.

Any organization that can avail itself of the opportunity to try-before-they-buy should take full advantage of that by engaging the CEO candidate as a consultant in advance of a final hiring decision. While this can be awkward for the candidate (confident and experienced candidates will relish this opportunity) and potentially a delay in the final decision for the recruiter, board and the team, finding out early that this relationship is not going to work is a small price to pay to avoid making a bad decision.

Founder adoption

There is no closer analogy for the hired gun CEO taking over a founder run business than adoption. Founders "baby" their startups, spending inordinate time and attention nourishing them during their early years. Mistaking taking over for the founder (especially one that remains involved in the business) for anything less than this level of emotional attachment is a fatal mistake.

So when I made the decision that we needed to change the name of our company as we positioned ourselves for market expansion, I knew I was in for a difficult process. The founder of my company had been its leader for almost 18 years by the time I took over. He had painstakingly bootstrapped the company and had done so quite successfully. Deciding only after this time that he was finally ready to take on some institutional capital in return for a partial cash out, he agreed to replace himself as the CEO.

The transition from founder to hired gun CEO actually went pretty well. We worked closely together, he as a mentor and me as a change agent. I made no material changes without a detailed discussion and rationale with him and ultimately, if I was passionate about a change, my direction was adopted. If not, and we disagreed, he often was able to talk me out of it.

This arrangement worked quite well. The company grew quickly during the first few years of the transition, culminating during the heat of the market runup in 2000 with us taking on some strategic investors (two of our clients) and our founder being able to cash out even more of his holdings at a very nice multiple. It was at this time, that we decided to expand our business. As our team reviewed the alternatives, one of the ideas that became clear is that we needed a bit more expansive name than the TLA (three letter acronym) that we had adopted as our call letters. So after much painstaking process, and many rejected attempts at renaming the baby, we all agreed (founder included) that the change would go into effect.

We positioned the name change to be announced at a gala affair we had arranged in conjunction with the San Francisco Giants baseball team. We had rented out (then called) PacBell field to invite some of our largest customers, partners, and investors to play ball with Vida Blue and Mike McCormick - two former Cy Young award winners, in a charity event. The idea was to make a big splash with our marketing repositioning.

The founder and I dressed in our best baseball garb in the visitors' club house and began the long walk out from the clubhouse through the dugout onto one of the finest baseball stages in the world. As we were coming up the steps of the dugout onto the field, the founder turned to me and matter-of-factly told me that he had changed his mind and that he was withdrawing his support for the change of name.

Fortunate for me it was too late. I pointed to the scoreboard out in center field that glowed with a welcome message with our new name and logo. The deal was sealed. The baby was renamed, and we all lived happily ever after. (By the way, four years later we sold the company for a slightly lower multiple than the heady valuations of 2000.)

The moral of this story? Don't take lightly the responsibility and emotion that is involved with adopting a founder-based early stage company. There is much more involved than meets the eye.

An Ounce of Preventive Medicine

Venture Capitalists are often the impetus for the charge of bringing on a new CEO. And almost as often, the founder/CEO is reluctant to accept the change. However, typically the founder is in no position to object. He really needs to close that round of capital! An expensive retained search ensues. The Founder studiously interviews multiple candidates. Board members, recruiter and Founder have regularly scheduled sessions to vet these candidates. Leading candidates attend second and third interviews with a selected few meeting the staff. The Founder is usually given the final veto which results in making an offer to the candidate that they feel will do the "least damage."

All too often, damage is what occurs. Several venture capitalists have somewhat jokingly stated that to save time and money they should do two searches at once - first for the transition CEO who will fail and then for his/her replacement. While I am not aware of any situation where two searches have taken place simultaneously, it is clear that making a bad hiring decision wastes not only tens of thousands of dollars of search fees and costs, the time and opportunity cost taken by the senior management team and the board to do the search, but also the months when the company founders (pun intended) while this transition CEO struggles with the duel charge of leading the company while establishing a comfort level with the Founder.

This disconnect can sew the seeds of months or years of below the surface conflict, lack of productivity, adding up to a very costly mistake. While a good process may have led to the decision to hire the "right" CEO, even the perfectly suited CEO may not succeed without sufficient advance spadework.

Experienced boards know that the process of hiring a successful transition CEO is based on much more than a good recruiting process alone. Many have found that a good fit depends even more on ensuring the Founder is clear on the roles and responsibilities of the CEO and the Founder - a task that is not as simple as it sounds.

So rather than making that expensive mistake, some preventive medicine may be in order. Here are some "commandments" that will ensure the success of your Founder Transition:

1) Before engaging in the search, get the Board, the Founder, and the senior management team together to talk about WHY a new CEO should be hired; what are the challenges that the company is or will be facing that the existing team is not alone capable of accomplishing? While board members are always busy, be sure there is at least one designated "friend" to the Founder that dedicates sufficient time and maintains a close connection to keep the Founder informed and interested in the process.

2) Discuss openly how the role of the Founder will change when the new CEO comes on board. How will other members of the management team be impacted? Be specific. Discuss roles and responsibilities that will shift from the Founder to the new CEO. Now is not the time to placate a Founder just to ensure they go along with the recruiting.

3) When engaging the recruiter, be sure he or she is aware of the special challenge that the new CEO will face in order to effectively replace the Founder. Recruiters can play an important role in ensuring a smooth process. Experienced recruiters are familiar with the potential problems in having the Founder either intentionally or not chase off potential candidates. If the recruiter is not sensitive to this issue - find another one.

4) Be sure the CEO and management team is using some type of structured interviewing process - Like Topgrading: How Leading Companies Win by Hiring, Coaching, and Keeping the Best People. (Often Founders and the management teams are not experienced in the appropriate techniques for identifying the right hire.)

5) Create a transition plan, ensuring that there is a specific plan for how the new CEO will be indoctrinated, what information needs to be transferred, who will be engaged in the process and a time line for reaching certain transition milestones. (I suggest you get the new CEO to read the book: You're in Charge--Now What? before he/she arrives for their first day at the new company.)

6) Founder and Board in advance of the selected CEO coming on board, work out the tactical details of titles (a new one for the founder), office location, support staff, etc. in order to avoid the first awkward moments of the new CEO's tenure.

7) When the new CEO comes aboard, be sure that Board members are personally present when the new CEO is introduced to show the support that the Board has for the new CEO. Hold an all employee meeting to introduce the new CEO. Be sure the CEO and Founder have coordinated their "statements" so that the company gets the message that these two are working together.

8) Reinforce this process several times with joint Founder/CEO/Board discussions, measuring progress against the transition plan.

Everyone involved in the success of the transition (recruiter, Board, CEO, management team) should know in advance that not all Founder/CEO transitions work. The founder will no doubt go through the standard "grief" cycles of shock, disbelief and anger prior to either accepting or at least convincing the board he or she has accepted the inevitable shift in his or her role.

Even with sufficient preparation, not every hire is a good one, and not every Founder is capable of sticking around while a new CEO reconfigures his/her baby. So be honest, be clear, be attentive, and be sure that the board and the Founder have a high bandwidth communication channel throughout the process.

A Factor Impacting Successful transitions

Some recent discussions have led me to to believe that a critcal factor that impacts the success of a CEO - founder transition may be the prior cashing out of at least some material portion of his or her ownership. Arguably, cashing out enables the founder to take some of her risk off the table. By doing so her replacement is more likely to be given the freedom necessary to make the decisions required to successfully lead the company.

Noam Wasserman writes on his blog Founder Frustrations, that "Bridge CEOs" are most times not successful and that VC board members have suggested that companies be prepared to hire two, since the first CEO who replaces a founder will not be successful. I've lived through both situations where founder successors have and have not been successful. A differentiating factor seems to be a pressure relief valve that is at least partially opened by cashing out.

The challenge facing any new CEO is to get the existing team, which may have a long history of working together and who were no doubt more comfortable before the CEO got there, to engage in a team building process to embrace change, accept diversity onto the team, and leverage the team’s existing talents. This always proves to be much harder that it appears.

If you ever joined an organization where the founders give up the CEO role but stay on with the company in functioning roles, you already know this is a difficult challenge. If you haven’t experienced it first hand, or perhaps read about some notable failures, if should suffice to say that it is very hard for a founder to give up control of his or her “baby.” This is a company that they have birthed, named, nurtured and financed. Giving up “control,” just because some investors say it will be for the greater good, may be acceptable in theory, but it is not easy to do. Even those founders who actually believe it may be good for the organization, historically have had a very a hard time actually giving up this control.

Many new CEOs make a precondition for their joining an organization the removal of the founders. While you lose the talents and the institutional knowledge by doing so, it often is the only way to get a clear change in direction, loyalty and leadership accomplished. Keeping founders around almost always leads to fragmented loyalty, back channel conversations, distrust of the CEO, and second guessing of the new CEO’s decisions. In fact there probably has never been a founder-CEO succession in which the founder has not believed that many of the new CEO’s decisions were flawed, misinformed or misdirected.